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Hamilton: Florida's
Rehabilitative Sex Offender Laws
NOTES
to the homes of employees to urge them to vote against the
union.1
(4) The employer may not make deliberate misrepresentations of material matters when he has special knowledge of facts
not known to his employees and the union does not have
sufficient time or opportunity to rebut these assertions. 9
(5) An "atmosphere of fear" of economic loss renders a free
choice by the employees impossible. 97 The employer may risk
creating such an atmosphere by inferring the possibility of a
plant shutdown if the union wins. 98 Even if the employer did
not create the atmosphere of fear - it having been created by
the community itself - he must actively disaffirm the possibility
of a plant shutdown or suffer the election, which may have
been favorable to him, to be set aside. 99
CONCLUSION

Since the early days of the Wagner Act, the Board and the courts
have attempted to afford the employer greater latitude in speaking
against the union. It is recognized that unions in many areas have
gained in strength and no longer require infant protection to survive.
This note has discussed in a general way only the most common of
the problems that may arise. Actual situations will always require
individual study and analysis of their particular facts.
MAURICE SHAMS

FLORIDA'S REHABILITATIVE SEX OFFENDER LAWS
The social problem of the sex offender is as old as recorded history.
In every society, certain sexual acts have been unlawful, as evidenced
by the earliest codes yet discovered.' Recent empirical studies by Dr.
A. C. Kinsey and others, however, have cast some doubt upon the
effectiveness of the law's attempts to deter deviate sexual behavior.

95. Supra note 44; Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545 (1957).
96. Celanese Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 291 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1961).
97. Supra note 52; Worth Mfg. Co., 134 N.L.R.B. . 49 L.R.R.M. 1207 (1961).
98. Aragon Mills, 135 N.L.R.B. _ 49 L.R.R.M. 1669 (1962); Storkline Corp.,
135 N.L.R.B. -, 49 L.R.R.M. 1666 (1962); Somismo, Inc., 133 N.L.R.B.., 49
L.R.R.M. 1030 (1961).
99. Supra note 53.
1. Waybright, Florida's New Child Molester Act: Unscientific, Unrealistic,
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It has been estimated, for example, that "6 million homosexual acts
take place each )ear for every 20 convictions. In the area of extramarital copulation the frequency to conviction ratio is nearly 30 to

'10 million to

300."

2

Modern studies in sociology and psychology, the development of
mass communications, and the "realism" of the times have all contributed to an increased public awareness of and concern about the
sex offender problem. In response to this concern, the Florida legislature enacted "the child molester law," in 1951 and the criminal
sexual psychopath law in 1955.1
The Florida sex offender laws represent part of a new trend in
the law's general approach to insanity. They approach the problem
of sex offenders by placing emphasis on institutionalization, segregation and treatment as opposed to traditional criminal punishment.
The social objectives are to protect society by confining the offender
so long as he remains a menace to others and to rehabilitate the
offender through clinical treatment. 5
THE CRIMINAL SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH LAW

Histo?),
The sexual psychopath law as enacted in 19556 was held unconstitutional7 within six months after passage, and was replaced
by Florida statute 917.12 in 1957 .8 The 1957 statute has remained
unchanged to the present time 9 and no reported case has construed
it.
As originally enacted in 1955 the law provided that any defendant
in any criminal prosecution could, by invoking certain procedures,
be examined by two psychiatrists and thereafter have a hearing before
the trial court to determine if he was a criminal sexual psychopath.'
Section seven declared that any person found to be a criminal sexual

Unconstitutional,26 FLA. L.J. 402 n.2 (1952), citing PRITCHARD, ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO TIIF OLD TFSTAMIENT 160, 162, 171, 172, 181, 185, 196

(1950).
2.

COMMITFfE

oN

FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

OF

ILE GROUP

FOR THE

ADVANCEmSEN]

(1950).
§§801-16 (1961).
Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29881, §§4-10, at 753.
Supra notes 3 & 4.
Supra note 4.
State v. Creekmore, 8 Fla. Supp. 189 (4th Cir. 1956).
Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-1989, §§1-12, at 24.
FLA. STAT. §917.12 (1961).
Fla. Laws 1955. ch. 29881, §4. at 753. Section one of the act defined a

OF PSYCIIIATRY, REI"T No. 9, PSYCHIATRICALL

DE.VIATED SEX OFFENDERS 2

FLA. STA'T.
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psychopath was forever immune from prosecution or punishment for
the crime with which he stood charged. Consequently, "such a criminal
sexual psychopath who committed murder, robbed a bank, forged a
check, testified falsely, or committed any other act made a crime by
the laws of this state could readily escape the usual and customary
penalties prescribed by statute by seeking a refuge under the protec'11
tive cloak of the Act.
In State v. Creekmore, 2 the defendant, under indictment for rape,
alleged that he was a criminal sexual psychopath and asked the court
to appoint two psychiatrists to examine him pursuant to a request for
institutionalization. Circuit Judge Stanley held the act unconstitutional, stating that 13
"It is apparent that the Act undertakes to fix an entirely new
standard or test of mental condition which may be invoked
on behalf of an accused as a legal excuse for the commission of
a crime. . . Any form of mental disorder or insanity falling
short of the legal definition of insanity, as stated in the McNaghten [sic] case, does not excuse the perpetrator of a criminal
act under a defense of insanity in this state ....
It is obvious
that the title says nothing about granting such psychopaths
immunity from prosecution or punishment for any and all
crimes committed in violation of law . . . . Instead it is confined solely to defining criminal sexual psychopathic persons,
the commitment of such persons and the procedure therefor."
The court then said that, in contrast to the limited purposes set
forth in the title, 14 the body of the act undertook to effect a drastic
change from the well-established "right and wrong" test' 5 of insanity
by providing that one could be excused from legal responsibility if,
in committing a crime, he was neither legally nor medically incompetent to realize the act he was doing, nor unable to comprehend the
moral quality of his act. Because the title was "misleading and deceptive" in relation to the import of the act itself, the court held
the act "wholly insufficient to apprise the legislators and the public
criminal sexual psychopath as "any person who is suffering from a mental disorder
which mental disorder is coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of
sex offenses ....

"

11. State v. Creekmore, supra note 7, at 190.
12. 8 Fla. Supp. 189 (4th Cir. 1956).
13. State v. Creekmore, supra note 12, at 192.
14. "The title to the Act reads -'An Act to define criminal sexual psychopathic
persons and to provide for the commitment of such persons and the procedure
therefor.'" Supra note 10.
15. The M'Naghten rule, as a test of legal insanity, was adopted in Florida
in Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (1902).
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of the broad and sweeping contents of the Act excusing criminal
sexual psychopaths from prosecution and punishment for crime" and
that the act therefore came within the evils intended to be arrested
by the "mandatory requirement" of the Florida Constitution.'
Operation of the New Act
The criminal sexual psychopath law was repealed following the
Creekrnore decision and replaced in 1957 by Florida statute 917.12an even more radical approach than the old version, but one that lnaN
have been cured of the defects which led to the Creekmore result.
A criminal sexual psychopath is now defined as a person who, not
being "insane or feeble-minded," suffers from a mental disorder
which has existed not less than four months, coupled with criminal
propensities to the commission of sex offenses, and who may be
considered dangerous to others.'
The law authorizes the institutionalization of any person who is
charged with or convicted of any non-capital offense, and who ik
found to be a criminal sexual psychopath, until there are reasonable
grounds to believe that he has recovered from his psychopathy "to a
degree that he will not be a menace to others."' ,"
The new act is civil, not criminal, in nature, and provides expressly that it is not intended to alter existing tests of mental capacit%
in criminal prosecutions.ls The crime charged need not be atsex
offense. The court need only satisfy itself that there is "probable
cause" for believing the person to be a criminal sexual psychopath.:"
Circuit courts of the state have exclusive jurisdiction of all proceedings
under the act, retaining the case from commencement of the proceedings until final discharge. Upon motion by an)' party or the court the
proceeding may be adjourned or sentence suspended and the person
certified for a hearing and examination by the circuit court itself,2
by two (or three) appointed psychiatrists.22 Upon report - ' and
hearing 2" the court determines whether the person is a criminal sexual
16. State v. Creekmore, supra note 12, at 194. See FLA. CONST. art. III, §16
(invalidating legislation to the extent that its title does not apprise a reader of
normal intelligence of the act's contents).
17.

FLA. STAI.

§917.12(1) (1961).

18. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (2) (d) (1961).
19. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (6) (1961).
20. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (2) (a) (b) (1961).
21. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (2) (a) (1961).
22. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (2) (c) (1961). The psychiatrists must be physicians
licensed in Florida and must have directed their professional service primarily to
diagnosis and treatment of mental and nervous disorders for a minimum of 5 years.
23. FLA. S1 kT. §917.12 (2) (c) (1961).
24.

Ftx. S'rxi. §917.12(2) (d) (1961).
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psychopath. The person must be committed to an institution if so
2 5

found.

Any time after institutionalization, an application may be filed in
the committing court alleging that the psychopath has improved to
a degree that he will not be a menace to others. A new hearing
identical to the original hearing must be held although the court
has discretion to appoint psychiatrists for a new examination.26

If

it is determined that the psychopath has not recovered he may be
returned to the institution. If a sufficient recovery is found, however,
the court must order the person discharged from the institution. 7
Criminal proceedings, if still pending, are recommended "upon the
order by the circuit court discharging the person from the institution."' 2 This provision seems to contemplate an institution of criminal
proceedings following the order of discharge; the court appears to
have no discretion in the matter and there is no provision for appeal.
Constitutionality

The defects of the old statute, criticized in the Creekmore decision,
appear to have been remedied by the new act. The act expressly
characterizes itself as civil, and provides that "nothing contained herein shall alter in any respect the tests of mental capacity applied in
criminal prosecutions under the laws of Florida." 29 It does not apply
31
30
to persons charged with a capital offense such as rape.
This statute has not yet been construed in any reported case.
Constitutional attacks upon statutes similar to the current Florida
3act in other jurisdictions, however, have generally been unsuccessful.
Such statutes have been upheld as a valid exercise of the police power,
notwithstanding constitutional attacks on grounds of denial of due
process or equal protection of law, double jeopardy, retrospective operation, self-incrimination, cruel and unusual punishment, or deprivation of the right to a jury trial. "Since these statutes are generally
25. Ibid.

26.

FLA. STAT. §917.12 (3)(1961).

27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. If criminal proceedings are begun in a trial court other than a circuit
court, the act provides that the trial judge may, upon a finding of probable cause
for believing the defendant to be a criminal sexual psychopath, adjourn the proceeding or suspend sentence and certify the defendant for examination in the
circuit court. Section 917.12 (2)(b) similarly provides that original criminal proceedings in the circuit court may be adjourned upon a finding of probable cause,
and examination procedures begun.
29. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (6) (1961).
30. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (5) (1961).
31. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1961).
32. See Annot. 24 A.L.R.2d 350, 354 (1952).
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held to be civil rather than criminal in nature and as providing tor
civil commitment and not punitive 33incarceration, most of such objections collapse of their own weight.' '
The Minnesota statute providing for proceedings for the commitment of persons having a psychopathic personality, was the first
"sexual psychopathic statute given the stamp of constitutionality."',,
Affirming the Minnesota court's judgment, the United States Supreme
Court 15 pointed out that for the purpose of determining prima facie
constitutionality it must accept the construction of the highest state
court. The Court held the statute was not too vague or indefinite
because it had been construed as requiring proof of a habitual course
of misconduct in sexual matters by persons "likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss, pain, or other evil on the objects of their
uncontrollable desire.' '3
Citing this case, a California appellate court in 1951 held that a
similar statute did not den) equal protection of the law to persons
adjudicated sexual psychopaths .3 This case held that the proceeding
was civil in nature, not criminal, and that a person committed pursuant to its provisions was not confined for a criminal offense but
because he was a sexual psychopath. Consequently the petitioner was
3
not placed twice in jeopardy for the same offense. 8
A similar statute in Michigan provided that upon the required
hearing to determine whether the accused was a sexual psychopath, it
was competent to introduce evidence of similar crimes by such person and a record of the punishment inflicted. This statute was held
not to violate the constitutional proscription of ex post facto law,"
because the ex post facto clauses of both the Michigan and federal
constitutions relate only to criminal cases and the statute in question
was civil in nature.3 9 For the same reason the court also held that
commitment of the defendant to a state hospital until recovered did
not violate constitutional prohibitions of excessive bail, excessive fines,
40
and cruel and unusual punishment.
However, a Massachusetts case held that a summary procedure for
commitment was tantamount to a prison sentence and hence invalid,
because the treatment center established in the state prison did not
comply with the requirements of the sexual psychopath statute.'
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 354.
State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939).
State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
Id. at 274.
Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 233 P.2d 159 (1951).
Id. at 217, 233 P.2d at 161.
People v. Chapman, 301 Mich. 584, 4 N.V.2d 18 (19,42).

40. Id. at 601-2, 4 N.W.2d at 28.
41. Commonwealth v.Hogan, 341 Mass. 372, 170 N.E.2d 327 (1960).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol15/iss2/6

6

Hamilton: Florida's
Rehabilitative Sex Offender Laws
NOTES
A recent California case held that the discharge as cured of a
committed sexual psychopath did not bar prosecution for the original
criminal offense, such prosecution being within the discretion and
conscience of the committing judge.42 The defendant had served
sixteen months in the state hospital and was then returned as cured.
Although medical experts certified that he was no longer a menace
to others, the court ruled the matter of criminal prosecution to be
within the discretion of the trial judge, to be exercised in light of
43
the entire history of the case and the dictates of his conscience.
Another California case held that despite the absence of an appeal provision in the sexual psychopath law 4 orders under the law
are appealable under the general statute providing for appeals in
special proceedings.
Measured by decisions in other jurisdictions, the Florida criminal
sexual psychopath statute appears valid. The key fact is that the act
is characterized as civil in nature, and is therefore not subject to
objections which may be raised against a criminal law. The act also
provides expressly that it does not alter any existing criminal law
tests of insanity. 45 Moreover, it no longer guarantees immunity from
prosecution for the crime with which the defendant is charged.46 It
seems reasonable to predict that a constitutional attack upon the
Florida statute in its present form would have little chance of success.
The validity of Florida's other rehabilitative sex offender law,
the child molester act, is another matter.
THE CHILD MOLESTER

AcT

Histoiy
The Florida child molester act 47 has had a stormy history. It has
been held both unconstitutional- s and constitutional 49 and has undergone considerable amendment- 0 To gain any real understanding of
this unique creation of the Florida legislature, it is necessary to trace
the development of the act in as orderly a fashion as the act permits.
The original act was passed in 1951 under the short title, "child
molester act."5 1 Offenses under its provisions included rape, attempted
42. People v. De La Roi, 185 Cal. App. 2d 469, 8 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1960).
43. Ibid.
44. People v. Bachman, 130 Cal. App. 2d 445, 279 P.2d 77 (1958).
45. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (6) (1961).
46. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (3) (1961).
47. FLA. STAT. ch. 801 (1961).
48. Copeland v. State, 76 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1954).
49. Buchanan v. State, III So. 2d 51 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
50. See Purpose of the Current Act, text at notes 75-83, infra.
51. FLA. STAT. §801.01 (1961); Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26843, §1, at 685.
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rape, sodomy, attempted sodomy, crimes against nature, attempted
crimes against nature, lewd and lascivious behavior, assault (when a
sexual act was completed or attempted), and assault and battery (when
a sexual act was completed or attempted), when such acts were
committed against, to, or with a person twelve years of age or under-'
Upon a defendant's conviction, the trial judge had "power and discretion" to impose the "sentence otherwise provided by law," or to
commit him for treatment and rehabilitation to the Florida state
hospital and stay the criminal proceedings or defer imposition of
53
sentence pending discharge.
The statute also provided for psychiatric examination after conviction'5 probation- and parole.56 Provisions relating to parole were
repealed by the 1953 legislature. In a 1953 caseF the Florida Supreme
Court held that a defendant who had been convicted under the act
but who had not been sentenced, could not be placed on parole, since
"the term 'parole' means the procedure by which a prisoner, that is
to say, a duly convicted defendant who has been sentenced and is
serving a term of imprisonment under the judgment of conviction,
'is allowed to serve the last portion of his sentence' "- on parole. The
court then declared the parole section inoperative, because parole
is exclusively a function of the executive to be exercised "only after
the defendant has been convicted and sentenced and hence after the
judicial labor has come to an end."5 in the same year there was added another amendment the effects
of which may not have been fully anticipated by the legislature. The
age of affected victims was raised to fourteen years or under. " The
sentence provision was amended from "as otherwise provided by law"
to "a term of years not to exceed twenty-five years in the state
prison."1 These revisions had the effect of changing the sentences
provided for by separate acts of the legislature, without amending those
separate acts and led directly to a holding of unconstitutionality the
next year in Copeland v. State. 3- This case arose on defendant's appeal
from a conviction of rape in Duval County, upon which a sentence of
death had been imposed. Defendant filed an extraordinary motion
52.
53.
54.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§801.02 (1961); Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26843, §2, at 685-86.
§801.03 (1961); Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26843, §§3-4, at 686.
§§801.03-.04, .06 (1961); Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26843, §§3-6, at 686-

87.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

FLA. STAT. §801.08

Fla. Laws 1951, ch.
Marsh v. Garwood,
Id. at 19.
Id. at 21.
FLA. STAT. §801.02
FLA. STAT. §801.03
76 So. 2d 137 (Fla.

(1961); Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26843, §7, at 687.
26843, §§10-12, at 688-89.
65 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1953).

(1961); Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28158, §1, at 590.
(1961); Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28158, §2, at 590.
1954).
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for a new trial, claiming that he could not be sentenced to death because the female victim was under fourteen years of age and that
his case thus came within the provisions of the child molester act. The
trial court declared the act unconstitutional as applied to the crime
of rape, and the Supreme Court affirmed on three grounds of noncompliance with section 16, article III of the Florida Constitution:
(1) the act embraced and included within its provisions
eleven different crimes defined in other statutes of the state of
Florida;
(2) the act did not publish at length the rape statute which
it attempted to amend; and
(3) the title of the act was insufficient to give notice that
one of the purposes of the act was to change the penalty for
rape when the verdict is guilty without a recommendation of
mercy, from death, to imprisonment for a period not exceeding
twenty-five years, when the age of the female is fourteen years
or under.
The court demonstrated the extent to which the 1953 amendment
provisions of eleven other crimes by
attempted to amend the penalty
63
use of the following chart:

"Offense
Attempted rape
(Assault with intent
to commit rape)
Sodomy
Attempted sodomy
(Assault with intent
to commit sodomy)
Crimes against nature
Attempted crimes
against nature
(Assault with intent
to commit crimes
against nature)
Lewd and lascivious
behavior
Assault (sexual act on
child under 14 yrs.)
Assault and battery
(sexual act on child
under 14 yrs.)

Punishment
Under
General Statute

Punishment
Under Child
Molester Act

10 yrs.

25 yrs.

Plus 15 yrs.

20 yrs.
20 yrs.
5 yrs.

25 yrs.
25 yrs.
25 yrs.

Plus 5 yrs.
Plus 5 yrs.
Plus 20 yrs.

10 yrs.
20 yrs.

25 yrs.
25 yrs.

Plus 15 yrs.
Plus 5 yrs.

5 yrs.

25 yrs.

Plus 20 yrs.

10 yrs.

25 yrs.

Plus 15 yrs.

25 yrs.

Plus 24% yrs.

10 yrs.

25 yrs.

Plus 15 yrs.

10 yrs.

25 yrs.

Plus 15 yrs."

6 months

Difference

63. Id. at 141.
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In 1955, the act was further amended. The crime of rape was
deleted from subsection (2), but otherwise no change was effected.4
In 1957 the legislature added incest and attempted incest as crimes
within the purview of the act. 5 Neither amendment was responsive
to the Copeland criticism that the act contained crimes denounced by
other statutes.
The 1959 case of Buchanan v. State,,;, a First District Court of
Appeal decision, upheld the act in its entirety. Defendant, convicted
of lewd and lascivious assault in Marion County, urged that the
twenty-year sentence imposed was illegal in that the act was unconstitutional and that he was in reality convicted under Florida statute
800.04, which prescribed a maximum sentence of ten years.The court upheld the child molester act on the grounds that:
(1) the Copeland case restricted its holding expressly to the
crime of rape;
(2) the act did not in terms purport to amend any prior
statutory provision and section 16, article III applies only to
laws that assume "in terms" to revise, alter or amend a particular act; 68
(3) the title of the 1951 and 1953 session laws put the legislature on proper notice that the act would provide for punishment for the offense of lewd and lascivious behavior to or with
children;
(4) even if the title of the act were insufficient under the
Constitution, "the act became valid by incorporation in the
general revision of the Laws of Florida .... .
In a vigorous dissent, Chief Judge Sturgis urged that"0
"IN]either the original act ... nor the 1953 act incorporating it
as part of the Florida Statutes meets the constitutional requirements of Article III, Section 16, Constitution of Florida, governing the enactment of a law that has the effect of amending
64.

FLA. STAT. §801.02 (1961); Fla. Laws 1955, ch. 29923, §1, at 858.

65.
66.

FLA. STAT.

§801.02 (1961); Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-1990, §, at 28.
111 So. 2d 51 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
67. FLA. STAT. §800.04 (1957) dealt with lewd and lascivious assault upon a
child under 14 years of age. The statute was identical to FLA. STAT. §800.04 (1961)
and its provisions appear to be entirely incorporated into subsection (2) of the
child molester act, with one exception: §800.04 is limited to offenses with regard
to a child under 14 years old, whereas the child molester act contemplates such
an offense with regard to "a person fourteen years of age or under." FL.%. ST'rT.
§801.02 (1961).
68. Buchanan v. State, 11l So. 2d 51, 57 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
69. Id. at 56.
70. Id. at 63.
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or revising an existing law ... [Incorporation of an act in a
general revision of the statutes does not cure the act of any unconstitutionality of its content. . . . By the same logic, any
legislative undertaking to revise or amend an existing law,
including those contained in Florida Statutes, must reenact
and publish at length the revised section, subsection of a section,
or paragraph of a subsection of a section."
In another 1959 decision, Ross v. State,71 the Third District Court
of Appeal affirmed a conviction of assault in a lewd and lascivious
manner on a girl under fourteen years of age, but held that the
sentence imposed by the trial court, one year in the county jail, was
unlawful. Citing Buchanan the court said, "[Tihe provision for
sentence as contained in [the lewd assault statute], which authorized
imprisonment in the state prison, or in the county jail, is superceded
by the penalty provisions for such crime as provided for in the later
enacted Child Molester Act" which directs imprisonment, if ordered,
to be served in the state prison at Raiford. 7 2 This language seems
to be a clear affirmation that the penalty provisions of the child molester act supercede those for identical offenses contained in other
Florida statutes. It follows, therefore, that the act remains subject to
the objection raised in Copeland - that it does not publish at length
the statutes that it attempts to amend. 73 Even though the act does not
"in terms" amend these statutes 74 they are, if Ross is controlling, as
surely and materially affected as if the change had been spelled out.
Operation of the CurrentAct
By no means were all of the crucial provisions of the child molester law brought into question in Copeland, Buchanan and Ross.
To evaluate the validity of the act as a whole, it is necessary first
to consider some of the other provisions not yet tested.
The act still applies to any person convicted of any of the twelve
enumerated offenses, including such persons placed on probation.One charged with such an offense may petition the court for a psychiatric and psychological examination, or an examination may be
ordered upon the court's own initiative. 76 All examinations are made
by a court-appointed psychiatrist and a clinical psychologist. The court
71.
72.
73.
74.
added.)
75.
76.

112 So. 2d 69 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
Id. at 70.
Copeland v. State, 76 So. 2d 137, 141 (Fla. 1954).
See Buchanan v. State, 111 So. 2d 51, 56 (lst D.C.A. Fla. 1959). (Emphasis
Ross v. State, supra note 71.
FLA. STAT. §§801.02, .03 (1), .08 (2) (1961).
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has discretion to refuse to order the examination prior to conviction.77
After conviction, if the judge elects to follow the procedure for institutionalization, the examination must be given. 8 If the latter procedure is followed, the trial judge may order the defendant committed
9
to either the Florida research and treatment center, or to the state
hospital to which he should be sent because of age or color, if found
to be psychotic or mentally defective.80
When the superintendent of the institution certifies to the committing court that the person "is not insane and further that [the]
institution has exhausted its curative abilities," the person is returned to the court for further disposition of his case. 81 A report is
also submitted with a diagnosis, prognosis and opinion as to whether
the person is dangerous to society.8 2 No persons can be discharged
without the permission of the court, but one discharged may be
8 3

placed on probation.

Other Aspects
84
the child molester
Unlike the criminal sexual psychopath law,

act does not guarantee the defendant the right to have counsel present
at the psychiatric examination. The United States Supreme Court,
in Carnley v. Cochran,s5 reversed a conviction under the act of an illiterate petitioner not represented by counsel.86 Although the holding
was restricted to the question of right to counsel, Mr. Justice Brennan
cast doubt upon the validity of the child molester act, stating: 8
77. FLA. STAT. §801.10 (1961). A 1957 amendment permits the defendant to
ask the court to order a similar examination of the complaining witness. FLA. STAT.
§801.101 (1961).
78. FLA. STAT. §801.03 (2) (1961).
79. FLA. STAT. §801.03 (1) (b) (1961).
80. FLA. STAT. §801.16(2) (1961). The Florida research and treatment center
is supervised by a chief psychiatrist, a chief psychologist and a chief psychiatric
social worker. The personnel at the center are hired by a Board of Commissioners
of State Institutions on recommendation by the Citizens' Therapy Board. This consists of the heads of the departments of psychology and psychiatry at Florida State
University, the University of Florida, and the University of Miami. Research as
well as treatment of patients is a function of the center. The Mental Health
Staff Board was created for the dual purpose of considering the patients' degree
of response to treatment with a view to discharge, and studying ways to improve
the effectiveness of the law. FLA. STAT. §§801.11-.12 (1961). See also Wills.
CriminalLaw Survey, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 521, 532 (1959).

81.

FLA. STAT.

§801.03 (3) (1961).

82. Ibid.
83. FLA. STAT. §801.13 (2) (1961).
84. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (2) (d) (1961).
85. 82 Sup. Ct. 884 (1962).
86. Carnley v. Cochran, 123 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 1960).
87. Carnley v. Cochran, supro note 85 at 885-86.
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"The assistance of counsel might well have materially aided
the petitioner in coping with several aspects of the case. He was
charged with... assault in a lewd, lascivious and indecent manner, upon a female child under the age of 14. At the time of
trial two sets of Florida criminal statutes contained language
reaching such behavior. Sections 741.22 and 800.04, Florida
Statutes, 1959, F.S.A., were general criminal provisions separately defining the two offenses of incest and assault in a lewd,
lascivious, and indecent manner. In addition, both offenses
were included within the later enacted Chapter 801 of the
Florida Statutes - Florida's so-called Child Molester Act - if
the victim was 14 years of age or younger . . . . The Florida
Supreme Court plainly conceived the petitioner's prosecution
for both offenses as having been under the Child Molester Act.
.. While that is an obviously plausible view, a lawyer, but not
a layman, might have perceived that because the Child Molester Act was invoked against the petitioner in respect of conduct elsewhere specifically defined as criminal, the 1954 decision of the Florida Supreme Court in Copeland v. State, 76
So. 2d 137, raised doubts, under the Florida Constitution, of
the validity of a prosecution based on the Act."
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment secured petitioner's
right to counsel and that the right had not been intelligently waived.8s
The child molester act differs from the criminal sexual psychopath
law in another important respect in that it fails to characterize itself
as either civil or criminal. From the provision relating to sentencing,8 9
and its effect on sentences prescribed in other statutes, 90 one might
well surmise that the act is criminal. But the act expressly provides
that the expense of examination may be recovered from the defendant's estate by the county, and that costs of treatment may be recovered by the state from the defendant's estate. 9 The "civil"
criminal sexual psychopath law only authorizes the state to recover
costs of examination and treatment, "where possible," from "such
person," without mentioning his estate.92 It might therefore be
reasonably inferred that the child molester act, with its broader cost
recovery provisions, is also civil in nature. If so, a court might well
inquire into the validity of a provision for imprisonment appearing in
a "civil" statute. Assuming that the provision is valid, the fact that
costs may be recovered though the defendant is not subsequently
88. Id. at 890.
89.
90.
91.
92.

FA. STAT. §801.03 (1961).
Copeland v. State, supra note 73 at 141.
FLA. STAT. §§801.07, .09 (1961).
FLA. STAT. §917.12 (7) (1961). (Emphasis added.)
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convicted 93 could be construed as compelling him to pay costs, which
is prohibited by the Florida Constitution except after conviction."'
The costs, moreover, could run to a sizeable amount if treatment is
protracted and might be considered both as an excessive fine 95 and a
cruel and unusual punishment. 91
The question of the character of the act has not been answered
by the courts. The act might be construed as both civil and criminal.
In its original form, the act provided alternative theories upon which
the trial judge might proceed, viz: "Sentence said person to the sentence otherwise provided by law, or

. .

. commit such person for

treatment
.... ."9- But the 1953 act, as amended, deleted the vord
"or." '8 Thus the act can no longer be said to provide for alternative
civil and criminal procedures. Was the "or" dropped by accident?
It has not reappeared, 99 although the provision has since been amended
in other particulars. 10o Whether by accident or design, the deletion
supports the proposition that the act is not one of alternatives but is
sui generis as a combination of civil and criminal procedure.
Another distinction is that the criminal sexual psychopath law
disclaimsol any alteration of the M'Naghten "right and wrong" test
of insanity, while the child molester act is silent on this point and is
possibly vulnerable to attack under the Creekmore rationale.1If the child molester act is a criminal statute, its violation is a
felony, 103 since the maximum sentence is twenty-five years in the state
prison.'01 The act provides for probationi(", which may be granted
93. This is a real possibility under the act, since examination may be had
prior to conviction. Although examination would usually be given only after a
defendant had been convicted under the act (FLA. STAT. §801.03 (1)-(2) (1961)), the
examination may be given before conviction if defendant petitions therefore and
the court approves or when the court of its own initiative orders the examination
after the defendant has been charged with an offense within the purview of the
act, which may be before conviction. FLA. STAT. §801.10 (1961). Thus, a conviction
may not necessarily precede the examination, or occur thereafter, because defendant might be acquitted. He would still be liable for costs under the act.
94. FLA. CONST. DECL. OF RiGrrs §14.
95. FLA. CONsT. DECL. OF RcIHTS §8.

96. Ibid.
97. FLA. STAT. §801.03 (1) (a), (b)
686. (Emphasis added.)
98.
99.

(1961); Fla. Laws 1951, ch. 26843, §§3-4, at

FLA. STAT. §801.03 (1) (a) (1961); Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28158, §6, at 591.
FLA. STAT. §801.03 (1) (a) (1961).

100. See e.g., Fla. Laws 1957, ch. 57-1990.
101. FLA. STAT. §917.12 (6) (1961).
102. State v. Creekmore, 8 Fla. Supp. 189 (4th Cir. 1956).
103. See FLA. STAT. §775.08 (1961).
104. FLA. STAT. §801.03 (1) (a) (1961). The provision is silent as to a minimum
period of imprisonment.
105. See FLA. STVF. §801.08 (3) (1961).
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in the trial judge's discretion after suspension of the imposition of
sentence 06 and apparently in lieu of commitment to the Florida research and treatment center or the state hospital. A violator cannot
be placed on probation until the court is satisfied-that he will receive
psychiatric help on a regular basis, with reports filed by the counselor
with the probation officer every six months.'07 Psychiatric treatment
is therefore a mandatory condition of probation in addition to those
suggested by the probation statute. 08 Costs of treatment shall not be
charged against the county.,0 9 If the defendant or his estate is obligated to pay the costs of treatment, this obligation might well be an
unreasonable condition of probation, especially when it is considered
that probation, if granted, may last as long as twenty-seven years.",
Although a defendant who has been placed on probation may petition for a writ of habeas corpus,"' there has been no reported case
under the act on this point.
If the defendant is institutionalized under the act, the trial judge
may in his discretion defer the imposition of sentence pending the
person's discharge from treatment." 2 No time limit is expressed for
such treatment. However, a Florida statute" 3 passed in 1957 provides
that when sentence has been withheld and has not been altered for
a period of five years, the defendant shall not thereafter by sentenced
for conviction of the same crime. Therefore if the trial judge defers
imposition of sentence pursuant to the defendant's institutionalization
under the act, the defendant presumably may not be sentenced to
prison if his treatment lasts longer than five years.
Validity
As early as 1952, the child molester act became the subject of
scathing criticism. One qualified critic urged that the law and its
basic assumptions are both invalid." 4 Describing its passage as the
result of a "manufactured illusion of a crime wave," he criticized the
"economy-minded legislature" for passing an act "which would require
treatment of only a few offenders," and attacked the singling out of
child molesters from other sex offenders simply because public sentiment could more easily be aroused to favor legislation when young
106.

FLA. STAT. §948.01 (1961).
STAT. §801.08 (3) (1961).
FLA. STAT. §948.03 (1) (1961).

107. FLA.
108.
109.

FLA. STAT. §801.08 (3) (1961).

110. FLA. STAT. §948.04 (1961).
111.

Ex parte Bosso, 41 So. 2d 322 (Fla. 1949).

112.

FLA. STAT. §801.03 (1) (b) (1961).

113. FLA. STAT. §775.14 (1961).
114. Waybright, Florida's New Child Molester Act: Unscientific, Unrealistic,
Unconstitutional,26 FLA. L.J. 402 (1952).
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children are involved.", ' Other constitutional objections raised were
the very grounds upon which the Florida Court held the act unconstitutional as applied to rape in the Copeland decision."1 The
act was also criticized as medically unsound and unrealistic since
psychiatrists themselves are in disagreement about diagnosis and
treatment.
The child molester act in its present form may be unconstitutional.
If attacked in an appropriate proceeding, it might be struck down
entirely or in part because:
(1) The act violates section 16, article III of the Florida
Constitution in that it covers twelve separate crimes defined by
other statutes, 11 while the Constitution requires that "each
law enacted in the Legislature shall embrace but one subject
and matter properly connected therewith, which subject shall
be briefly expressed in the title ....
"11
The provision is
1
mandatory. "5
Furthermore, the act does not publish at length
the criminal statutes that it amends by increasing the maximum
sentences. The Constitution requires that "the act as revised or
• . . amended, shall be reenacted and published at length."12 1
Both of these defects were denounced in the Copeland case and
have not been cured.121

(2) For reasons discussed earlier, the act could be classified
as criminal, or civil, or alternatively civil or criminal122 or a
combination of civil and criminal procedure. If criminal,"the issues of recovery of costs of examination and treatment
24
are valid constitutional objections.1
115.
116.

Id. at 403.
Id. at 405-7; Copeland v. State, 76 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1954).

117.

FLA.STAT. §801.02 (1961).

118.
119.
120.
121.

FLA. CONsr. art. III, §16.
Boyer v. Black, 154 Fla. 723, 18 So. 2d 886 (1944).
FLA. CONsr. art. III, §16.
Copeland v. State, supra note 116, at 141, 142. Although the First District

Court held in the Buchanan case that any deficiency in the title of the act was
cured by the incorporation of the act in the general revision of the laws of Florida,
this still may not have had the effect of curing other constitutional objections.
Chief Judge Sturgis, dissenting, stated that such incorporation did not cure the

act of any unconstitutionality of itscontent, and that any legislative attempt to
amend or revise an existing law must "reenact and publish at length" the revised

section. This has not been done.
122. Despite the absence of the word "or," it may still be open to the trial
judge to elect which procedure he will follow.
123.

As it may be, since nearly every reported case arising under the act has

resulted from an appeal of conviction and sentence under it. For other cases, see
Adams v. Culver, Ill So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1959); Champlin v. State, 122 So. 2d 412 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
124. Supra note 94.
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CONCLUSION

Florida's rehabilitative sex offender laws are a study in contrasts.
The criminal sexual psychopath law, while not nearly so elaborate
in its treatment provisions as the child molester act, has at least been
cured of the defects which rendered its earlier prototype unconstitutionalJ25 It provides a procedure that is expressly civil in nature
and appears valid as measured by decisions from other jurisdictions.
If the treatment provisions of the child molester act were incorporated
into the criminal sexual psychopath law, the latter might be made
more effective as a means of rehabilitation. But there is no serious
legal fault to find with the law in its present form.
However, the child molester act contains serious defects which
make it vulnerable to attacks upon its constitutionality. The defects
discussed in the Copeland decision for the most part have not been
cured; the only legislative response was to drop the crime of rape and add those of incest and attempted incest. Presumably the public
pressure for initial enactment was not followed by a sense of urgency
to make needed corrections. It may be expected that the other problems raised by the act, e.g., parole, probation, its possible alteration of
the M'Naghten rule, its civil or criminal character, will not be resolved
until the Florida Supreme Court has had occasion to either follow
its decision in Copeland or overrule it and affirm the district court's
decision in Buchanan upholding the act.
To avoid the risk of another holding of unconstitutionality, the
child molester act should be amended in the light of the following
criteria:
(1) The act should expressly characterize itself as a civil
or a criminal statute. If it is to be civil, the lead of the criminal
sexual psychopath law should be followed and the provisions
for sentence and imprisonment should be eliminated.
(2) If the act is to be criminal, the penalty provisions of
other affected statutes should be re-enacted and published at
length, as required by the Florida Constitution. Or, the legislature should re-adopt the provisions of the original 1951 act
giving the trial judge discretion to impose sentence otherwise
provided by law.
(3) The problem of recovery of costs for examination,
treatment, and as a condition of probation should be clarified. If the act is to be criminal in nature, provision should
be made that costs are not recoverable except upon an adjudication of guilt. They also should be limited to a reasonable
amount.
125.

See State v. Creckmore, supra note 102.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1962

17

